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Abstract 
OPTIMAL TARGETING REGIMES AND INSTRUMENT RULES IN THE BASIC NEW 
KEYNESIAN MODEL 
by 
Luc Marest 
 
Adviser: Professor Thom Thurston    
 
In the first chapter, the objective is to measure the value of commitment in executing 
monetary policies in the context of the New Keynesian model and with value that is represented 
by the standard quadratic welfare function containing weighted output gap and inflation 
variances.  It is found that there is a substantial potential for improvement of welfare under 
commitment, but this depends on some key parameters in the model.  The range of parameter 
calibrations most often found in the literature, however, suggests the improvements will be large. 
We then consider specific monetary policies akin to Taylor rules.  From the optimality 
conditions we derive a Taylor-type rule that meets the optimal path conditions exactly.  Further, 
we derive a form which is actually guaranteed to produce a determinate outcome the model’s 
endogenous variables and welfare. 
The first chapter outlined the baseline of the New Keynesian model and provided an 
analytical solution to measure welfare for discretion, pre-commitment and global policies. The 
analysis was done under the presumption that policy makers seek to maximize the standard 
social welfare. The second chapter measures the benefit of “delegating” authority to the central 
bank to maximize other welfare functions. It is assumed that the public is convinced the central 
bank will maximize this particular welfare on the long run. These alternative approaches are 
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referred as speed limit, price level targeting, and nominal income growth targeting. The chapter 
shows to what extent some of those approaches may provide higher welfare than when adopting 
the global target and how it depends on the parameters. The chapter shows also that another 
alternative would be to including volatility of interest rate in the welfare function. While this 
strategy would not often provide a higher welfare than the global target, it has the advantage of 
making the volatility of interest rate low, which could be beneficial when trying to avoid the 
lower bound issue.    
The third chapter investigates on how to implement the policy that will replicate the 
optimal paths found in previous chapter for each of the approaches.  In the New Keynesian 
model, the most common procedure that central banks use is the Taylor rule which links the 
nominal interest rate with inflation and output gap. However, this raises questions about 
determinacy. This chapter demonstrates that when using a money rule, one which uses money as 
the instrument, determinacy constraints are not very different from the ones encountered with an 
interest rate rule. In the same vein, the adoption of a Wicksellian rule (the interest rate or money 
responds to the price level and output gap) does not make it easier to find a stable and unique 
solution.  
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Preface 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the role of the central bank to deal with the 
situation has been the source of a vast literature. It re-emphasized the need to examine the benefit 
of different monetary policies. This thesis is about the gain in welfare of adopting different 
targeting approaches and the choice of instrument rules to implement monetary policies. 
At the origin of the thesis were two questions that Professor Thom Thurston asked me to 
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encounter when using interest rate rules such as the Taylor rule? It has been the starting point of 
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Professor Thurston. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The value of central bank commitment to the price level 
in the baseline New Keynesian model 
 
Co-author: 
Thom Thurston, Queens College and Graduate Center, CUNY 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In the “Science of Monetary Policy” Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) derived a “global 
optimum” policy commitment and the associated theoretical optimal paths for endogenous 
variables (output gap, price level, inflation, among others) in the baseline New Keynesian Model 
(NKM).  This followed a discussion of paths they had derived for the more-familiar 
“discretionary” paths where authorities cannot commit to future policies, and inflation-
commitment (which they called “commitment”) paths where the authority can commit to follow 
a policy that optimizes over current and expected output gaps and inflation.  In this chapter we 
will call this level of commitment “inflation-commitment.”1  The key difference between the 
“global” and the earlier alternatives is the assumption that authorities commit to a plan to control 
the level of future prices rather in a particular way than just inflation rates.  We will call this 
“price level-commitment” in our paper.  As this chapter shows with various parameter 
                                                            
1 The use of the word “commitment” to refer to commitment limited to future inflation rather than prices, appears to 
have been short-lived.  In Gali (2008) the term “commitment” (optimum) is used to refer to the “global optimum” 
policy in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).  A policy which sets policy to a first-order condition that involves 
expected period-ahead inflation (formerly, “commitment”) is not mentioned in his book.  We do consider it and call 
it “inflation-commitment” in this paper. 
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assumptions, this commitment to price level may have considerable value in terms of welfare, 
depending on the value of certain key parameters.  It also has some important side-effects like 
reducing the volatility of the interest rate and eliminating the possibility of trend inflation.   
It is important to emphasis that in conventional use, as in “Science of Monetary Policy” 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), “discretionary” refers to the time-consistent solution. It is 
considered a Nash equilibrium. Given a situation with no commitment, the central bank will use 
at each period a first order condition that is developed using the two current values of x and π. 
The public recognizes that condition and forms expectations based on the point where the 
marginal cost of choosing a particular inflation rate just equals its benefit. However, if 
commitment power is added, then the first order condition and the target change. 
The sections are organized as follows. With the baseline NKM model we (Section 1) 
compare the paths of the endogenous variables in this set-up with the more familiar 
“discretionary” and “inflation-commitment” regimes. We then (Section 2) show analytically how 
price-level commitment improves welfare and how much this improvement is sensitive to 
parameter values. Using calibrations we (Section 3) measure the magnitudes by which welfare is 
improved by commitment and how these measurements vary with parameter calibration. We also 
(Section 4) consider some side-effects of price level commitment, in particular on trend rates of 
inflation (they are eliminated) and in the volatility of interest rates (nominal volatility is reduced; 
what will happen to real interest rate volatility depends on the parameter structure). We (Section 
5) derive a modified Taylor rule which will bring about the price-level commitment paths under 
this theory. Finally (Section 6) we analyze the determinacy conditions for solutions to the global 
model, finding the there exists a Taylor rule which satisfies the optimality conditions as well as 
determinacy.  
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1.1 The NKM baseline model and paths of endogenous variables   
 The baseline NKM consists of a Calvo-type Phillips Curve (1.a) and a NKM IS curve 
(1.b). Variables are expressed as deviations from steady-state.   
(1.a)     
 
(1.b)   
 
where πt is t-1 to t inflation, xt is the “output gap,” ut is a “markup shock” or supply-side shock, 
and gt is a demand-side shock arising from shifts in perceived productivity of capital. The shocks 
ut and gt are assumed to be fully observed and to follow first-order processes, ut = ρut-1+ηt and gt 
= λgt-1 + εt where ρ and λ are fractions and ηt and, εt are white noise.  The standard welfare 
function, which we will use throughout this paper, can be written 
(2)  W =  
where β is a discount factor and Г is society’s - and the authority’s - weight on the output gap.  
This specification is essentially that presented by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and is a 
simplification of the more complete model developed by Woodford (2003, chapter 6) and in 
standard usage in more recent years.2 Given the set of u and g shocks, policy makers implement 
a monetary policy that affects the interest rate to take levels that will meet the f.o.c.’s.3    
                                                            
2 The IS curve often is written with a real interest rate term to represent the demand-side check. There is no 
particular advantage of this as compared with adding the gt term at the end of (1.b). Also, more recent presentations 
and derivations present the u-shock above (1.a) in the form κξ, where ξ is the actual markup shock. This does not 
affect our results, so we stick to the u-shock approach. There are some additional parameters that imply some 
interrelationships among the parameters above. We will introduce and discuss them below. 
3 The authorities maximize (2) subject to (1). The first order condition (f.o.c.) for the discretionary and the inflation 
commitment regimes are i=0….∞, xt+i = (-κ/Γ) /πt+i for discretion and  xt+i = (-κ/Γ(1-βρ)πt+i, i=0…..∞, for inflation 
commitment. The f.o.c. for the price level commitment regime is  xt+i = (-κ/Γ) /(pt+i – p-1), i=0….∞ , where pt+i is the 
level of price at t+i, and p-1 is the lagged price level at the period before the start of the policy and fixed thereafter. 
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The more precise nature of this policy is unnecessary for this section but will be 
addressed later. The variables πt and xt in  (1.a) and (1.b) have been solved for in the literature 
subject to maximization of (2) under the following three alternative time-consistency 
assumptions:  (1) agents assume the monetary authority will maximize (2) each period without 
reference or consideration of the policy choice on future inflation (discretionary policy); (2) the 
authorities are able to commit convincingly to a policy that incorporates the model’s forecast of 
inflation in future periods (inflation-commitment policy); and (3) authorities commit 
convincingly to a policy that involves not only commitment to influence future inflation rate but 
also the level of future prices (price level commitment). As we shall show, price level 
commitment has great value in terms of improved welfare and some other helpful side effects in 
the context of this model. Table 1 illustrates the path solutions in these three cases. Recall that ut 
= ρut-1+ηt and gt = λgt-1 + εt. It should be noted that no IS shocks (gt) enter the solutions, since 
these unambiguously should be offset through movements in interest rates. The optimal policy 
(whatever particular form it takes) should preclude gt from entering the paths of x and π.   
The parameters involved in (1.a and 1.b)-(2) above are all involved in these paths except 
σ and λ, which appear in the IS (1.b). Whatever specific monetary policy is employed must move 
the interest rate in a way to meet the first order conditions while at the same time just offsetting 
any of the IS shocks (gt); essentially, the IS side is not involved in determining the optimal paths.  
The following Chart 1 illustrates with one specification of the parameters (β=0.99, κ=0.024, 
Γ=0.0048, ρ=0.35) the impulse response functions implicit in these paths. These are responses to 
one standard deviation of ηt (assumed to equal 1.0). 
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Table 1a: First order conditions for the three regimes 
Regime                                                                  First order condition 
Discretionary case:                                               ttx   
 
Inflation-commitment case:                                   ttx 

)1(   
 
Price- level commitment case:                              )( 1 ttt xx  
 
  
 
Table 1b:   Optimal paths for the three time-consistent cases 
Policy regime Inflation or prices Output gap 
Discretionary case: inflation 
and output gap paths 
 
 
 
 
 
Inflation-commitment case: 
inflation and output gap 
paths 
 
 
 
 
 
Price- level commitment 
case:  
price level and output gap 
paths 
 
)(
1 11 
 tttt uu
  
ttt uxx   )1(1 
   
with 

a
a
2
411 2 ( 0 < δ < 1) and 
)1(2  
a  
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Chart 1.a: Impulse responses of inflation, output gap, and interest rate to a unit shock in ηt 
 
Chart 1.b: Impulse responses of inflation, the price level, and money to a unit shock in ηt – case 
where interest elasticity of real money is equal to 0.05 
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Chart 1.c: Impulse responses of inflation, the price level, and money – interest elasticity of real 
money demand equal to 1 for discretion and inflation-commitment and equal to 5 for price-level 
commitment 
     
 
A number of things stand out from these paths. First, the volatility of inflation appears to 
increasingly diminish as the level of commitment is increased. This is the key difference among 
regimes.  The commitment to the price level, making it stationary (in this case at an arbitrary 
value of 1.0), requires that future inflation eventually be negative and in an amount large enough 
to cancel out the positive effects on prices in the earlier periods. Since inflation is linked to 
expected future inflation (1.a) this dampens the response to shocks of current inflation.   
Second, the volatility of the output gap is actually increased from discretion to inflation-
commitment, but this volatility for price-level commitment is the least in all three regimes.  
Third, the volatility of interest rates appears diminished as commitment increases (we will show 
in Section 4 that this is parameter-specific for the discretionary vs. inflation-commitment regime, 
although interest rate volatility will always be lowest for the price-level commitment regime).  
Fourth, the money supply paths are well-defined and generally reflect the price level paths, 
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although for high enough interest elasticity of money demand money initially moves in the 
opposite direction of prices and inflation (Chart 1.c).4   
Finally, the price-level commitment path unlike the other two involves a lagged price and 
lagged output gap.  The presence of lagged terms is referred to as “inertial” in contrast to the 
purely “forward-looking” role of expectations in the other two paths.  The important role of these 
lagged effects arises not from the impact of the actual t-1 (or earlier) values of these variables; 
rather, it is to the pattern of future movements they imply – in effect, “forward inertia.”  A 
literature (Woodford (2003a), Giannoni (2010, 2012) and others) has referred to “inertial policy” 
in which interest rate rules like the Taylor rules include lagged variables (including lagged 
interest rates) inhibit movement or “smooth” interest rates over time. We return to this issue in 
Section 5, where we introduce a Taylor rule. At this point we emphasize that the interest 
volatility reductions of price-level commitment we have illustrated are independent of any 
particular rule that may be employed to arrive at the optimal path solutions. It would be 
inappropriate to infer from these paths, therefore, that a motive of interest rate smoothing has 
anything to do with them.  
1.2 Welfare and improvements from commitment 
In order to evaluate improvements in welfare, we express the different regimes’ solution 
for (2) in Section 1.  The expressions turn out to be: 
 
 
                                                            
4 This assumes that money is present, which is not required in a ‘cashless” version of this model. The money 
demand-supply side are typically ignored under the argument that that any money-based optimal policy would be 
equivalent in this model where shocks are fully observed. A money supply-oriented policy would be more 
complicated, however, on account of the likely presence of money demand and money supply shocks which are 
automatically accommodated (and have no effect) when an interest rate approach is used. 
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Table 2:  Solutions for W (equation 2) for three regimes 
W under discretion 
 
 
W under inflation-
commitment  
 
W under price-
level commitment 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Welfare “levels” and improvements for different parameter settings 
In this section we consider the impacts that different parameters (ρ, β, Γ, κ) will have on 
measured welfare (W), later in the section how these parameter values will determine how much  
“improvement” in welfare would appear across regimes. Our objective is to find parameter 
ranges in which prospective improvements would be major. We do not calibrate or estimate 
these parameters ourselves, but we do compare them with the ranges typically found in the 
literature (Table 3).   
It should be noted that the parameters are interrelated. The parameter Γ in the Woodford 
(2003, chapter 6) derivation is Γ=κ/θ where θ>1 is the price elasticity of demand for the goods 
produced by monopolistically competitive firms.  The parameter κ, from the Phillips curve (1.a) 
follows: 
10 
 
 
where τ >0 is the elasticity the representative firm’s real marginal costs with respect to its own 
price level. Although κ and Γ are not independent, we have enough free parameters 
independently to select hypothetical combinations of κ and Γ that would  imply major impact of 
price commitment on W. The restriction that θ>1 does suggest a restriction that Γ < κ which 
according to Table 3 is only sometimes observed. Table 3 illustrates the ranges used in some 
recent literature. The ranges employed in the literature are [0.024, 0.33] for κ, [0.1, 0.8] for ρ, 
[0.002, 0.5] for Г, [0.157, 1] for σ, and it seems that there is a large consensus for β=0.99.  
 
 Table 3:  Calibrations in recent literature 
  
Authors Year σ b β κ ρ Г ω θ τ 
Hoffman, Rasche, Tieslau 1995  2         
Roberts 1995    0.075       
Rotemberg, Woodford 1997 0.16  0.99 0.024     0.47 
Holman 1998  0.1         
McCallum, Nelson 2000   0.99 [0.01,0.05]  0.25     
Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan 2000  2.6         
Jensen  2001   0.99 0.1  0.25     
Walsh 2001   0.99 0.05  0.25     
Ireland 2001  
5.26  
and 8.33         
Woodford 2002 0.157  0.99 0.024 0.35      
Aoki, Nikolov 2003 0.157  0.99 0.0238 0.35      
Woodford 2003 0.16  0.99 0.024  0.05   0.47 
Giannoni, Woodford 2005 0.16  0.99 0.024    7.69   
Bils, Klenow 2004       0.5    
Schabert 2005 2  0.99    0.8    
Gaspar,Smets, Vestin 2006   0.99 0.019  0.002  10   
Billi 2008 0.16  0.9926 0.024 0.1 0.003 0.66 7.66   
Walsh 2010 1  0.99 0.05  0.25 0.8  1 
Giannoni 2010     0.35      
Bauducco, Caputo 2010   0.99 0.33 0.8 0.5     
Walsh 2011   0.99 0.25  0.25     
Giannoni 2012 0.157   0.99 0.0238 0.35         
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Impact of ρ and β 
Chart 2 illustrates the effects of different values of 0 ≤ ρ <1, then of 0 <β <1, holding other 
parameters at fixed values. As the chart shows, higher values of both parameters have negative 
impacts on W and the deterioration is most pronounced where commitment is least. The 
sensitivity of this effect is most pronounced at the high end of these parameters.  
Chart 2: Impact of ρ and β 
     
Note: κ held at 0.024, Γ held at 0.0048.  In the left chart β held at 0.99.  In the right chart ρ held at 0.35.  
 
Higher ρ implies persistence in u-shocks spread over time and whose impacts are reflected in 
higher variance of current inflation. Higher values of β have similar effects and relate the impact 
of future expectations price on current prices in the Phillips curve (1.a). In the literature (see also 
Table 3) the calibration of ρ is usually in the range of 0.10 to 0.8, where the variation across 
regimes is not very great. The parameter β is almost invariably chosen to be 0.99 which gives a 
major “edge” to the price-level commitment regime but leaves the others close to each other. In 
what follows we select ρ=0.35 and β = 0.99 and concentrate on the effects of κ and Γ but the 
results of course are sensitive to the choice of ρ. A different selection of ρ may have major 
impacts on the variances and surfaces. 
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Impact of κ and Γ 
 Variation in κ and Γ can have pronounced effects on W and the differences in W across 
regimes over some ranges (Chart 3). Higher κ, which increases with price flexibility, improves 
W; indeed, large enough κ eventually will make W=0 in all three cases – that is, as κ →∞, the 
model becomes essentially classical. Larger Γ will reduce W in all three cases continuously. The 
higher weight on the output gap variance will result in less inflation-“hawkishness” now and in 
the future, leading to greater impacts of u-shocks on inflation.  
Chart 3: Welfare under three regimes 
 
Measuring improvement from commitment 
If we ask the question how much improvement in welfare we see with increased 
commitment, we can ask what happens to the ratio of welfare under different parameter settings.  
In particular, measures of proportional improvement are the ratios of Wπ to WP or Wd to WP. As 
already suggested by Chart 3, the major jump in welfare occurs in the jump from Wπ to WP. 
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Chart 4 focuses on the ratio of Wd to WP.5 It shows that the improvement from commitment lie 
in a “corridor” for κ and Γ. Improvement is indicated by the “improvement ratio” Wd/WP or 
Wd/Wπ. Most of this improvement is concentrated in the jump from inflation-commitment to 
price level commitment. For example, Wd/WP is 1.503 at κ=2.5, and Γ=6.  The ratio of Wd/Wπ 
(not shown) is only 1.1067. 
Chart 4: Improvement in welfare 
 
Along a kind of “corridor” the “improvement ratio” is high and stable and along a 
particular contour is constant. This corridor is illustrated in contour lines Chart 1.5 (for Wd/WP 
only).  It might be noted that the “maximum” ratio (1.74) involves a nonlinear relation between 
in κ and Γ in which the ratio Γ/κ falls as the level of both fall. The restriction implied by 
Woodford’s relation noted above that Γ=κ/θ with θ>1 thus suggests that the values which meet 
this restriction must be on the low side as shown in the right panel of the chart. It would appear 
                                                            
5 These welfare measures are negative with higher absolute values implying lower welfare.  The ratios of lower-
commitment to higher-commitment can be viewed as a proportional measure of improvement 
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from Table 3 that the parameters are lower than those we have been using in our examples 
(κ=0.024, Γ=0.0048) but that it is no uncommon to violate the condition that Γ < κ (as we have). 
These particular issues aside, it seems safe to conclude that the parameters chosen in the 
literature are in a range that would imply substantial improvements in W from commitment.  
Chart 5: Contours of welfare improvement with different values of κ and Γ 
 
1.4 Two useful side-effects of commitment 
 
     There are two side-effects of the price level commitment that deserve attention. First and 
perhaps obvious is that a policy that achieves the optimal paths is guaranteed to eliminate trend 
inflation. A number of authors (viz., Ascari and Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007)) have shown that 
the presence of trend inflation considerably complicates the derivation of the Phillips curve (it is 
no longer of the tractable form as in 1.a). Further, this revised Phillips curve can severely limit 
the range of policy choices that will have determinate solutions. Price-level commitment appears 
to avoid this problem.  
A second beneficial effect is that commitment to control price level optimally can 
substantially reduce the volatility of interest rates (cf. Woodford (2003a), Giannoni (2010, 2012). 
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The model in this chapter does not specify a benefit of reduced interest rate variance.6 A 
particular benefit in the context of this model of reduced interest rate variance of any optimal 
policy is reduced chance of hitting the lower bound interest rate. There may be other virtues to 
reducing inflation and its variance, but they are generally not addressed in models of this type.7  
Chart 6.a: Nominal interest rate volatilities: effects of Γ at three different values of κ 
 
Chart 6.b:   Real interest rate volailities: effects of Γ at three different values of κ          
     
 
                                                            
6 Woodford (2003a) and Giannoni (2010, 2012) however do. Welfare (more precisely, social loss) includes the 
variance of the interest rate in their work. 
7 Woodford (2003a), Giannoni (2010, 2012) are the exceptions as they put the variance of interests into their social 
cost function. 
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Chart 6.a  shows that nominal interest rate volatility (σi2) is in all cases lowest (and 
possibly considerably lower) under price-level commitment. (These volatility measures include 
only the component of volaility that arises from the u-shocks. Volatilty arising from the 
independent g-shocks are systematically offset by means of interest rate “jumps” in the amount 
of σgt, implying an independent and constant component of interest rate volaility equal to σ2σg2.)  
Whether inflation-commitment produces lower interest volitility than discretion depends on the 
range of Γ. Real interest rate volatility across regimes (Chart 6.b), including even the price-level 
commitment one, appears to depend on the relative magnitude of κ vs. Γ.   
More perspective on the effects of parametization on interest rate volatility across 
regimes is available in Chart 7,which shows the effect of different sets of κ and Γ on both the 
ratio σiP2/ σid2 and the ratio σiπ2/ σid2. The much lower ratios σiP2/ σid2 in some ranges indicates 
considerable power of price-level commitment to lower interest rate volality. Inflation 
commitment appears to offer modest reductions in interest rate volatility at best. At low values of 
κ and Γ a movement from discretion to inflation-commitment may greatly increase interest rate 
volatility.  
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Chart 7: Improvement of interest rate volatility 
  σiP2/σid2     σiπ2/σid2 
 
 
  
  
The contours for σiP2/ σid2 is illustrated in Chart 8. Interestingly, the locus of minimum 
0.0 points is linear, reflecting a condition that κσ/Γ=1. When this is true, σiP2 (or at least that 
component arising from u-shocks) is 0.8 Again, the range of κ and Γ that would imply large 
suppression of interest volatility appears to be large, and includes the range suggested by the 
recent literature (Table 3). 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 The slope of unity in Chart 8 is an artifact of the fact we used the assumption σ=0.16 in order to construct the 
graph. 
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Chart 8: Contours for σiP2/σid2 
 
 1.5 A modified Taylor rule 
To this point we have discussed only the paths of the endogenous variables including the 
interest rate, and no specific policy procedure or rule has been specified. The main classes of 
monetary policy rules include money stock-driven rules (in which money responds to 
endogenous variables) or interest rate policies. The standard approach is interest rate rules, of 
which Taylor rules have been the most studied. Any interest rate rule must, for determinacy, 
involve reactions to endogenous variables in the model (determinacy to be discussed in Section 
6).    
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The Taylor rule that applies most directly to the version of the model we have been 
considering is of the form  
(3)      
The shock term gt represents a “demand shift” (more precisely, a shift in the expected marginal 
efficiency of capital) that shifts the demand for spending on the IS schedule (1.b). As mentioned 
earlier and emphasized by Woodford (2001) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), an optimal 
monetary policy would shift the interest rate just enough to offset this shock perfectly. Thus the 
optimal value of φg should equal to σ in (1.b). In the price level commitment regime at hand, it is 
not possible to find combinations of parameters of form (3) that would produce the optimal path, 
but a modification is consistent with the optimal path, namely: 
(4)  it  = φp ??t  + φp-1 ??t-1   + φg gt, 
where ??t =pt –p-1 and ??t-1 = pt-1-p-1, and provided that the parameters of the model including 
these φ’s satisfy the eigenvalue conditions for determinacy. These values will not necessarily 
satisfy the conditions, but the rule can be rewritten as 
(5)  it  = φp ??t  + φp-1 ??t-1  +φxxt + φg gt, 
which will exactly match the optimal path provided the φ’s follow:  
 )1(1 p ,  )1)(1()1( 
 xp , and φg=σ.9 
                                                            
9 Place the interest rate rule (5) in IS curve (1.b), and using the paths 
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The ??  variables are deviations of the price from a fixed starting value at t-1 (p-1): for example, ??t  
= pt - p-1. The obvious and key difference from the Taylor rule (4) is the separation of the 
coefficients on ??t  and ??t-1. This permits the rule to bring the long-run level back to the fixed 
level of p-1.   
 There are two more interesting remarks that can be made about the Taylor rule and its 
coefficients. First, as discussed in the previous section, provided there is commitment it is not 
necessary that the Γ weight be treated as the “true” (Γ*) value. We might wish to vary Γ in order 
to affect the variance of interest rates or perhaps even the preferences of the central bank 
different from the society’s. Or, there may simply be different or varying societal Γ*. All of these 
affect the Taylor rule in a way which makes “inflation hawkishness” inversely and 
monotonically a measure of the “inflation hawkishness” of monetary policy. This is clear from 
the expressions for W in Table 2. For the price-level commitment case, the relation is more 
complicated but inflation volatility also varies directly with Γ. For example, Chart 9 illustrates 
the relationship for various three κ’s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
conform with the path of the price level we need to have 
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Chart 9: Inflation volatility for different choices of Γ  
 
 
In this context, the choice of Γ can be regarded as an inverse measure of “hawkishness” 
(toward inflation) in all the three regimes. 
 The second remark has to do with the lagged dependence of the Taylor rule interest rate 
on the price level. Since a lagged endogenous variable appears in the rule, it is not improper to 
describe this as an “inertial” interest rate policy. But some researchers have gone further to 
impute a desire to suppress interest rate volatility as a reason for policy “inertia,” and suggested 
that monetary policy adjusts partially to desired interest rate levels in order to achieve this 
“interest rate smoothing.” In empirical estimates of the Taylor rule, lagged interest rate 
coefficients appear to be substantial and hard to reject statistically. Further, in simulation 
experiments allowing for a lagged interest rate or other endogenous variables (“Wicksellian” 
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rules) has improved simulated outcomes for inflation and output. The optimal W (2) in this paper 
however reveals no motive for suppressing interest rate volatility; rather the reduced interest rate 
volatility seems to be a natural by-product of commitment to a stationary price level. We would 
attribute the improved theoretical performance with lagged interest terms and Wicksellian rules 
as a result of price-level commitment (which of course appears to improve W). Strong estimated 
estimates of lagged interest rates in Taylor rules may of course have multiple potential causes of 
which might be included a desire to dampen the trend in the price level (implicitly a commitment 
to future price levels).10  
1.6 Determinacy and the Taylor rule 
Considerable attention has been paid to the determinacy conditions in models of this type. 
The standard analysis was developed in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Bullard and Mitra 
(2002).  
The model with explicit treatment of the price level can be written: 
(6)       
The IS curve with the Taylor rule in the previous section is 
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and the price level must evolve as 
                                                            
10 We have experimented with many different ways of rewriting (5) with the optimal restrictions on the φ’s.   One 
of these is  
   
 
.  The two moving average errors would seem to present 
estimation difficulties, but we believe it would not be surprising for an estimated coefficient on it‐1 to appear to be 
significant (although not necessarily consistent).  
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(8)  ??t  = πt  + ??t-1. 
 
The system can therefore be written in the form 
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The Blanchard-Khan conditions for determinacy require that of the three eigenvalues in 
M, two must be outside the unit circle and one inside. Deriving an analytical expression of these 
conditions in terms proved difficult, so we studied cases with a variety of assumed parameter 
values for the model parameters σ, β, ρ, κ, and Γ. As an example for σ=0.16, β=0.99, ρ=0.35, 
κ=0.024, and Γ=0.0048, we find the range of determinant combinations of φp and φx as in Chart 
10. 
The Blanchard-Khan condition will be met only if the combinations of φp and φx lie to 
the right of the boundary in the left panel of Chart 10 and, on the right panel, above the 
horizontal line when φx>0, not restricted when φx <0. The optimal combinations are pictured as 
the roughly diagonal line in the right panel. The same basic pattern appears with other parameter 
assumptions.  
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Chart 10: Regions of Determinacy for φp and φx 
The indeterminate region is in shadow 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evident in Chart 10 is the fact that there are an infinity of combinations of φp and φx that 
will lead to determinate solutions both on the NE and SW portions of the optimal-combination 
line. With the downward boundary on the left panel and the horizontal restrictions on the φx>0 
side of the right panel, it is clear geometrically that the optimal path can always be obtained with 
the appropriate combination of φp and φx. 
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1.7 Concluding remark 
The chapter (1) shows how different degrees of commitment to future monetary policies 
can be improve welfare in the NKM model. It (2) measures the improvement in welfare that can 
result from a commitment to period-ahead inflation to commitment to bring the future price level 
back to a starting level, and (3) shows how the improvement can be sensitive to the basic 
parameters in the NKM formulation. The parameter ranges used in the recent literature happen to 
be the ranges in which the potential improvement in the welfare would be large. The chapter also 
(4) points to important side-effects of increased commitment, including elimination of expected 
trend inflation and a reduction in interest rate volatility. The chapter (5) shows a modified Taylor 
rule that can actually bring about the paths necessary to the improvements in welfare, and 
demonstrates that (6) such a rule which maximizes welfare can be set to avoid determinacy 
problems.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Gain from Commitment to Different Monetary Targets  
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the baseline of the New Keynesian model and provided an 
analytical solution to measure welfare for discretion, pre-commitment and global targets. That 
analysis was done under the presumption that policy makers seek to maximize the standard 
social welfare. It revealed that the gain under commitment is important but varies depending on 
the parameters. A number of authors, however, have acknowledged that the time-inconsistency 
problem associated with commitment may be difficult to overcome. To deal with the problem, 
one solution would be to assign a welfare function and assume delegation. Through this 
institutional device, the central bank would have to implement that target. 
The concept is to “delegate” authority to the central bank to maximize other welfare 
functions in order to get a better result for the standard social welfare. It assumes that the public 
is convinced the central bank will maximize that alternative welfare function on the long run. 
The rule will be to follow a first order condition obtained by optimization of the welfare selected. 
The central will be expected to meet that condition in the present and also later indefinitely. 
Some authors called this approach as discretionary targeting in the sense that the issue of time-
inconsistency is assumed away under delegation. If delegation is implementable, the natural 
tendency would be to select the global target as it was the optimal solution when deriving the 
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social welfare. The fact that an institutional mechanism constrains the central bank to follow a 
specific first order condition overtime is a way to ensure that commitment is implemented 
indefinitely. 
In the previous chapter, it was remained that the notion of “discretion” refers to the time-
consistent solution of a maximization of a welfare function. In “Science of Monetary Policy” 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), it is considered as a Nash equilibrium and at each period the 
central bank will use a first order condition that is derived by considering the two current values 
of x and π. It is important to note that the first order condition and the target change when any 
form of commitment is added. The alternative approaches considered in this chapter involve 
commitment in order for them to be time-consistent. 
There are some reasons to select a welfare function different than the social welfare. 
First, another welfare function may be easier to understand from the public. Second, there may 
be some difficulties in observing the values of some variables such as the output gap. So 
alternative targets may deal with that problem by making observations more accurate; for 
example the speed limit approach targets the difference of output gap instead of the level of 
output gap and it is supposed to be more precise. To illustrate the problem, Orphanides (2000) 
mentioned that output gap was not measured correctly during the 1970’s. The potential output 
was not estimated properly. It was attributed not only to the optimistic assumption about the 
level of unemployment compatible with full employment but also largely to the optimistic view 
of how an improvement of the rate of labor productivity would translate into the growth of 
output. Policy makers during that period became more activists to make sure that output reaches 
the level of potential output and as a consequence they created excess inflation. Walsh (2001) 
argues that using the growth of potential output would be measured more accurately than its 
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level. Thus, the use of the difference of output gap rather than the level of output gap in the loss 
function would prevent in part some of the mismeasurements.   
Finally, by choosing a different target, it could be possible to get a higher social welfare 
than the one from global targeting. The previous chapter showed that policy makers can get a 
higher social welfare under commitment than under discretion. An alternative approach would be 
for the central bank to maximize another welfare function, so having another targeting regime 
and choosing the weight between the targets, but still try to maximize the social welfare as a final 
objective. This chapter provides evidence that directly adopting some alternative targeting 
regimes could produce a higher social welfare than the one obtained when adopting global 
targeting. Thus there is a possibility that maximizing other welfare can generate optimal paths 
that would improve the standard social welfare even when optimized using global targeting.         
This chapter evaluates the performance of different targeting approaches suggested by 
various authors. Four targets are considered. First, Walsh (2003) suggested that choosing the 
growth in output relative to the growth in potential output rather than the output gap itself in the 
loss function may reproduce the same kind of result than with the global target. It is the speed 
limit target and it was introduced to diminish the problem of error in output gap calculation. 
Second, one loss function that a central bank can adopt is one that incorporates the volatility of 
price level rather than the volatility of inflation, and it is referred as the price level targeting. It is 
compatible with the idea of bringing back price to its original level after a shock as in 
commitment. Third, Jensen (2002) considered to add a nominal income growth objective into the 
loss function of the central bank. Nominal income growth targeting is motivated by its ability to 
a nominal target so it is in monetary terms. Finally, Woodford (2003) introduced the idea of an 
interest-smoothing target. It is an approach that incorporates the volatility of interest rate into the 
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welfare function. The inertia that would then appear in the evolution of the interest rate would 
create paths in inflation and output gap that would be similar to ones found in the global target.  
Originally, the objective of using those alternative targeting objectives was to reproduce 
the results of the global target but adopting a discretionary approach. As mentioned above, 
discretion is related to delegation to central bank. One of the most surprising results is that the 
central bank could actually get a higher social welfare while implementing price level or nominal 
income growth targeting than when using the global strategy. It may be counterintuitive but in 
fact, due to the specific constraints associated with the optimization with the global strategy, the 
result for welfare is not automatically the absolute optimal result that can be obtained. The 
chapter shows that for any values of the parameters, the central bank can choose a weight on 
output gap in the welfare function that makes price level targeting the strategy that provides the 
higher welfare.   
Furthermore, the chapter shows that the interest-smoothing targeting objective would 
allow to dealing better with the lower bound issue because with that approach the volatility of 
interest rate is much lower than when using other targets. In addition, while it may trigger more 
inflation, the volatility of output gap would be diminished a lot so that strategy may be easier to 
implement and prevent the temptation from the central bank to switch. The interest-smoothing 
targeting objective however does not improve welfare much and then provide then lower results 
than the previous approaches.  
2.1 Model 
The basic New Keynesian model was introduced by Yun (1996), Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997) and others. The version established by Clarida, 
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Gali, and Gertler in “The Science of Monetary Policy” (1999) and further described by 
Woodford in “Interest and Prices” (2003) is widely used in recent work in policy design. The 
paper follows the version of the model presented by Walsh (2003). Households provide labor, 
purchase goods for consumption, hold money and have bonds. Firms produce different goods in 
a monopolistically competitive goods market, designed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Capital 
stock is ignored. Price stickiness is specified by the Calvo’s model in which it is assumed that 
prices adjust infrequently. Each period, there is a constant probability 1-ω that the firm can 
adjust its price. So there is a probability ω that the firm must keep its price unchanged. 
Furthermore, it is forward looking because expectations of future variables are in structural 
equation describing behavior of consumers and firms. We have the traditional log linearized 
equations: 
t
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Equation (1) is the “IS curve”. Equation (2) corresponds to the supply curve; it is the 
Phillips curve, or inflation curve. Equation (3) determines the quantity of money. It is the 
demand for money. The following variables, εt, ηt, and ψt are white noises. 
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  The other part of the model is the welfare function. Using targeting rules, policy makers 
try to find the solution of a stochastic dynamic optimal control problem. There is a general 
consensus among academics (Svensson 1999) to adopt a loss function that depends on the 
variability of inflation and output gap. By adopting an inflation target rule, central banks have for 
objective to stabilizing inflation around an inflation target. It is flexible in the sense that it takes 
also into consideration the stability of the real economy. It is recognized that central banks are 
concerned also about output gap when implementing their policies. So the loss function takes the 
form of L = (πt-π*)2 + Гxt2 where π* is the inflation target. The inflation target πt* here is zero. 
Woodford (2003) demonstrated that it can be derived by optimizing household utility. In the 
function loss, πt is the inflation at time t, xt the output gap and Г the relative weight on stabilizing 
the output gap. Г is the relative importance of output gap volatility in the preference of central 
bank. The goal for the central bank is then to maximize the welfare 
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2.2 Gain from alternative regimes 
2.2.1 Speed limit 
As mentioned by Woodford (1999) and McCallum (1999), the optimal results are 
obtained with monetary policies that are history-dependent. Walsh (2002) proposed a speed limit 
targeting rule implemented in a discretion mode to provide the kind of inertia that would 
improve social welfare. The central bank reacts to the change of output gap rather than its level. 
Using a hybrid Phillips curve, they conclude that this rule follows closely the global strategy. 
Stracca (2006) reaches also the same conclusion using data from the euro area. It was also 
confirmed by Yetman (2006). Using neo-classical model, Hatcher (2008) reaches similar 
conclusion. In this paper, using a forward Phillips curve, it is argued that the central bank can 
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adopt a weight on output that makes that approach superior to the pure discretion strategy. 
However, it cannot do better than the global strategy.  
We should be then able to extract the optimal solution for the relationship between xt and 
πt that is established by the central bank. In the discretionary case, as it has already been well 
established that the central bank should minimize πt2 + Гxxt2  subject to not only the Phillips 
curve but also the IS curve because it involves interest rate.  
In the speed limit case, the loss function takes the form: 
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Optimizing using discretion, we get the following first order conditions: 
By deriving by πt+j: 0  jtjt   
By deriving by xt+j: 0)( 1   jtjtjt xx   
So we get the following first order condition:     )( 1 ttt xx  
The first order condition for speed limit under discretion is the same as the one from the 
global case. The paths are then identical to the ones from global target. Incorporating the paths of 
inflation and output gap found by optimizing the speed limit welfare with a weight Гsl into the 
social welfare that has a weight 
 , the welfare from the speed limit target is always superior 
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to the welfare of pure discretion when Гsl is low enough (see Chart 11 b/ in which Γsl is below 
0.01), but it is always lower than the welfare from the global approach (See Chart 11 c/). The 
inertia created by using the change of output gap instead of its level improve welfare of 
discretion but the relationship Woodford (2003) found between Г and κ provides the optimal 
weight on output. 
Chart 11: Comparison of welfare for speed limit with welfare for discretion and global. Salmon 
is the color used to represent the speed limit case 
a/ Welfare for discretion, global b/ Difference of welfare between c/ Percentage difference between 
and speed limit   speed limit and discretion  speed limit and global 
 
   
 
2.2.2 Price level targeting 
 Some authors (Fisher (1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995) and Kiley (1998)) use the idea 
of an increase of volatility of the output gap to oppose a price level targeting regime. In contrast, 
Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999) and Svensson (1999) argue that this regime shows a 
reduction of the volatility of not only inflation but also output gap. However, those results are 
obtained using a neo-classical Phillips curve. On the other hand, Dittmar and Gavin (2000) and 
Vestin (2003) found that this result holds with the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is 
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forward looking. The policy provides a more favorable combination of volatility of inflation and 
output gap. 
The stickiness of prices may be a factor that plays a role in the decision to target price 
level. According to the New Keynesian Phillips curve, it is the difference between current 
inflation and expected inflation that makes output gap fluctuating (Kiley 1998). When future 
inflation is expected to increase then output gap decreases. Due to the fact that price are sticky, 
firms increase their price to response to anticipated increase of future demand. As a consequence, 
the aggregate supply shifts negatively, and it as for effect to decrease current output. Price level 
targeting implies deflation after an initial inflationary shock, so it provokes more volatility in 
output gap. In contrast, Svensson (1999) weighted on the debate by claiming that policy makers 
may get a “Free Lunch” by adopting a price level targeting. However, he was using 
“Neoclassical” Phillips curve with incorporates lag inflation. 
We should be then able to extract the optimal solution for the relationship between xt and 
πt that is established by the central bank. In the price level targeting case, as it has already been 
well established that the central bank should minimize pt2 + Гxt2 subject to the Phillips curve, or 
inflation equation. Under discretion, it should thus minimize 
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As a consequence, we obtain the following paths  
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We can find also the path for the real interest rate and money: 
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The paths shown in Chart 12 have the same characteristics than the ones from the global 
regime. Inertia seems even more pronounced that with the global or speed limit approaches.    
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Chart 12: Optimal paths for price level targeting 
   
 
In chart 13, welfare with price level targeting is in blue and it has the same kind of 
pattern than the welfare from other policies. However, price level targeting seems to be a 
superior target. For any price stickiness κ, the central bank can select a low weight Гp on output 
gap that would provide a welfare that is higher than welfare with not only discretion but also 
global cases. Again, Γp is the weight that a central bank put on the volatility of output gap when 
optimizing the welfare for price level targeting. However, the ultimate objective is still to 
optimize the social welfare. Blake (2001) demonstrated that the global first order condition found 
when maximizing social welfare is not the optimal solution. It is possible that the targeting of 
other welfare function could provide better outcome. Chart 13 demonstrates that conclusion. In 
chart 13 a, it can be seen that for some combination of Γp and κ, the social welfare obtained 
when optimizing the welfare for price level targeting is greater than the social welfare resulting 
from the global regime. The percentage difference between the two is seen in chart 13 b.  
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Chart 13: Comparison of welfare for price level targeting with welfare for discretion, pre-
commitment and global. Blue is the color used to represent price level targeting 
a/ Welfare for discretion, pre-commitment,  b/ Percentage difference between price level targeting 
global and price level    welfare and global welfare 
 
 
2.2.3 Nominal income growth 
Stability of the nominal income targeting regime has been studied for a while. However, 
the result depends mainly on the model adopted, and particularly the form of the Phillips curve. 
Ball (1999) used a backward looking Phillips curve and concluded that not only nominal income 
growth targeting is not efficient but also it creates instability in the sense that the variances of 
inflation and output gap are infinite. In contrast, McCallum (1997) argue that stability depends 
on the specifications of the Phillips curve. With a forward looking model, he finds that nominal 
income growth targeting is not instable. Dennis (2001) reaches similar conclusion. Malik (2005) 
found that nominal income growth targeting performs better than the price level targeting rule, 
using a continuous New Keynesian model. Incorporating endogenous persistence, Hanson and 
Kapinos (2006) showed that the alternative rules such as nominal income growth targeting do not 
perform as well. If there is a forward looking component in the model, it is enough to make the 
system stable. It depends then on the form of the Phillips curve. 
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The loss function for the nominal income growth targeting is: 
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It is found by the following derivations: 
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targeting objective took place. 
As a consequence, the central bank is implementing an objective using also price level as a 
target. 
We then have the path for tpˆ and it is  
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We can then deduct the paths for the other variables. 
For the output gap we get: t
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For the interest rate, we would obtain: 
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We can get also the real interest rate: 1 tttt Eir   
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The paths for nominal income targeting offer also the kind of inertia that is similar to 
global, price level targeting and speed limit cases (see chart 14). 
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Chart 14: Optimal paths for the nominal income growth case 
 
In a similar analysis used in the previous section, chart 15 b shows that generally nominal 
income growth targeting is superior to pure discretion, particularly when price stickiness κ is 
lower and the weight on output is larger. Furthermore, chart 15 c indicates that the nominal 
income growth regime is not providing a better welfare than when implementing a price level 
targeting. It should be noticed that when the two welfares in chart 15 c are compared, the weights 
Γp and Γgdp are moving the same amount. 
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Chart 15: Comparison of welfare for nominal income growth with welfare for discretion, pre-
commitment and global. Violet is the color used to show nominal growth targeting 
a/ Welfare for discretion,   b/ Percentage difference between c/ Percentage difference between 
pre-commitment, global and  welfare for nominal income  welfare for nominal income 
nominal income growth  growth and welfare for discretion    growth and welfare for global   
  difference 
 
 
 
2.2.4 Welfare gain with different regimes 
Chart 16 shows how price level targeting is a superior regime. The central bank can 
choose a low enough weight Гp on output in price level targeting to get a higher welfare than 
with any other regime. It should be reminded that the objective is still to maximize the social 
welfare 
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t xE  . We compare thus different regimes to obtain the maximum 
social welfare. As described above, those regimes include strategies that optimize a different 
welfare with their own weight Гp ( Гp is used here as a symbol for all the weights for the different 
regimes) that reflects the importance that the central bank put on variables such as inflation, price 
level and output gap. In chart 16 a, the level of welfare is represented for the different regimes 
depending on the price stickiness κ and the policy weight Гp. We observe that for any level of 
stickiness κ, the central bank would select a weight Гp low enough to get the highest welfare and 
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every time the price level targeting offers the best solution. Chart 16 b/ indicates how price level 
targeting is proportionally superior to nominal income growth targeting. It is noticeable that the 
more sticky prices are, the lower Гp needs to be to select the price level targeting over the other 
regimes.   
Chart 16: Comparison of welfare for discretion, pre-commitment, global, price level targeting 
and nominal income growth targeting  
a/ Welfare for discretion, pre-commitment,  b/ percentage difference between welfare for price 
global, speed limit, nominal income growth  level targeting and welfare for nominal income 
and price level targeting    growth 
 
 
2.2.5 Interest-smoothing targeting 
In the interest-smoothing regime, it is assumed that the central bank is also concerned by 
interest rate volatility. Initially, Woodford and Rotemberg (1997) raised the concern that interest 
rate could hit the zero lower bound and suggested that incorporating the interest rate volatility 
into welfare would minimize that risk. Woodford (1999) also argued that the addition of an 
interest rate smoothing objective in the loss function would introduce inertia and improve 
welfare.   
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The goal for the central bank is then to maximize the welfare 
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Again, it is optimized under discretion. As mentioned before, it is defined as a regime 
that is implemented at the beginning of each period by policy makers after they examined data 
from the economy and they optimize their decision. The central bank does not consider future 
dates, so it cannot affect the expectation of private agents. Individual agents know that the 
central bank proceeds this way. The expectation from the private sector is that policy makers will 
continue to adopt that strategy. The policy makers have no incentive to modify their behavior, 
and the expectations of the private sector are rational; here it is implemented through delegation.  
We should be then able to extract the optimal solution for the relationship between xt and 
πt that is established by the central bank. Under discretion, as it has already been well established 
that the central bank should minimize πt2 + Гxxt2 + Гiit2 subject to not only the Phillips curve but 
also the IS curve because it involves interest rate. It should thus minimize 
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For the discretion case, we get the following first order conditions: 
By deriving by it+j: 01    jtjti i  
By deriving by πt+j: 0  jtjt   
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By deriving by xt+j: 0  jtjtjtx x   
So we get the following first order condition: 0 ttitx ix   
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Here, ψt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the inflation equation and γt is the 
Lagrangian multiplier associated with the IS curve. It should be noticed that Etπt+1 disappeared in 
this equation because the central bank does not consider future dates. 
We get the following optimal paths: 
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with  ttt uu   1  and ηt is a white noise process with constant variance σu2. 
We can find also the real interest rate. 
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For the money path, we incorporated σgt into the path for interest rate to neutralize the 
shock from the demand curve. These paths are the optimal paths after a shock ut from the 
Phillips curve. This shock ut represents usually a difference between the marginal cost and the 
output gap. In this process, deviations of inflation and output gap from steady state in the past are 
neglected. What counts is to bring back inflation and output back to target. 
If the economy is subject to an impulse in the Phillips curve, contrary to inflation and 
output gap, price level is not forced to go back to previous levels, and goes up without limits. We 
can see that by deducting the path for the price level. We have pt = πt+pt-1 so we obtain: 
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Even if monetary policies use interest rate rules, money is not completely absent in the 
model. Then we can use the money demand equation to find the optimal path for money: 
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According to Woodford (2003), Γi and Γx have a specific relationship. When calculating the 
welfare obtained when using this regime, only Γx will change so we can compare with other 
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regimes. Chart 17 shows the path for the different variables when choosing the interest-
smoothing regime. It is noticeable that these paths have the same kind of shape than the paths 
derived under pure discretion. No inertia is created and it will have as a consequence a lower 
welfare than the other regimes.  
Chart 17: Optimal paths for discretion for interest rate smoothing approach 
 
2.3 Comparison of different regimes 
The idea is the same as in the previous section. The paths from the different alternative 
regimes are used to calculate this new welfare. Analyzing the gain from the alternative regimes, 
the result of this paper shows that the price level targeting rule still dominates the other 
approaches. Even considering the volatility of interest rate, the benefit of emphasizing on 
bringing back price to its original level is predominant. However, it is the case when the central 
bank may choose the weight Гp (again it symbolizes here the weight for each of the different 
regimes) that appears on the loss function. The highest is price stickiness, the lowest this weight 
has to be to reach the highest welfare through price level targeting. If Гp is not low enough, then 
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nominal income growth targeting would be superior in case of high stickiness. It is possible now 
to see the results in chart 18. 
Chart 18: Welfare for discretion, speed limit, nominal income growth, price level targeting and 
interest rate smoothing approach. Aqua is the color used for interest rate smoothing approach. 
Both charts are the same but the range for κ and Γp are different 
 
 
Chart 19 shows the percentage gain of the different policies against selected others. In chart 19 a, 
it can be seen that the interest-smoothing regime provides a higher welfare than pure discretion 
when using a large enough Γp (which is Γx for the interest-smoothing regime). In the same vein, 
chart 19 b shows how the speed limit approach has a higher welfare than in the interest-
smoothing case when Γp is low enough (Γsl for speed limit and Γx for interest-smoothing). 
Finally chart 19 c demonstrates that price level targeting provides a higher welfare than speed 
limit. All of these conclusions are found for a specific range of Γp and κ that are appropriate 
considering the standard calibration from the literature. For a different range of selection, the 
shape of the charts would be different. 
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Chart 19: Percentage gain of different regimes in terms of welfare 
a/ Percentage gain of discretion b/ Percentage gain of speed limit c/ Percentage gain of price level 
 against interest rate smoothing against interest rate smoothing against speed limit 
 
 
 
The key to obtain the highest welfare is for the central bank to use the weight on the 
output gap (or other variable in certain regimes) inside the loss function. From the graphs, it is 
clear that policy makers would get a higher welfare with either price level targeting or nominal 
income growth targeting depending on the weight on output gap. Chart 20 shows the percent 
difference between the two regimes. At any level of stickiness, the highest welfare that a central 
bank could produce when choosing among the regimes described above is the one by selecting 
price level targeting. It can do so when choosing a weight Γp low enough.  
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Chart 20: Percentage gain of nominal income growth against price level targeting in terms of 
welfare 
 
 
The calculation of welfare involves the trade-off between the volatility of inflation and 
the volatility of output gap. Traditionally, the idea is that inertia created through the different 
regimes described in this chapter would lower the volatility of inflation and increase the 
volatility of output gap. It is not as simple as that however. In any case, it is the change of the 
trade-off between the two that can potentially increase welfare. The ultimate goal would be then 
to search for the best combination. The volatility of inflation and output gap for the different 
regimes are shown in chart 21. In Appendix C, we can see the graphs showing the differences 
between each policy. 
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Chart 21: Volatility of inflation and output gap for discretion, global, price level targeting, 
nominal income growth targeting and interest rate smoothing approach   
a/ Volatility of Inflation    b/ Volatility of Output Gap 
 
 
 
It can be seen that the approach including the volatility of interest rate into the loss 
function provides the lowest volatility of output gap but also the highest volatility of inflation. 
Thus that approach would be easier to implement in terms of consistency but the welfare is not 
improving a lot compared to the traditional discretion case. 
What can be observed also is that, contrary to earlier conclusions from authors, price 
level targeting decreases output gap volatility. It is actually the key point that makes that strategy 
superior to others when trying to reach the highest welfare. Even if that policy increases 
volatility of inflation, policy makers can find the highest welfare with it when decreasing the 
weight on output gap. Furthermore, output gap volatility is lower with price level targeting than 
with nominal income targeting. 
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2.4 Volatility of interest rate and lower bound issue 
In a low inflation environment and when nominal interest rates are close to zero monetary 
policy makers would have a limited ability to ease in response to adverse shocks. The focus of 
the literature is to propose strategies when traditional monetary policies become apparently 
inefficient. An increasing number of economists revive the idea of stabilizing nominal income 
growth targeting as a strategy. This paper has another perspective. Having found analytical 
solution to calculate welfare for different regimes, it is also possible to develop formulas to 
assess the volatility of interest rate. As a consequence it is possible to evaluate to what extend the 
different approaches can reduce this volatility to prevent the situation in which the nominal 
interest rate is immobilized at zero. 
Chart 22 shows, for a specific level of price stickiness, how volatility evolve when central 
bank manipulate the weight Гp on output that appears on different monetary approaches. Using 
the calibration from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Г is considered to be around 0.0048 in the 
social welfare. This chapter showed that the central bank can obtain the highest welfare when 
adopting a price level targeting rule with a very low Гp. According to the results shown in chart 
19, it would require to increase that weight Гp to reduce the volatility of interest rate. However, it 
can be seen that that the central bank could be significantly more effective at lower that volatility 
by choosing discretion with the social welfare incorporating transaction frictions, or the interest-
smoothing regime. It implies that policy makers would switch from price level targeting to 
inflation targeting policy. As shown in chart 18 and 19, it would have for consequence to reduce 
welfare. It is the cost of avoiding the problems created by the lower bound for interest rate.     
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Chart 22: Volatility of interest rate for the different regimes considered in this chapter 
 
2.5 Concluding remark 
A commitment rule should in general produce higher social welfare compared to 
discretion. However, several authors suggested other different targets to reproduce the inertial 
behavior observed in commitment. In the speed limit case, the central bank would focus on the 
growth of output gap instead of its level. For the price level targeting strategy, the emphasis 
would be on price level rather than inflation. Finally, the nominal income growth targeting would 
replace output gap by the growth of output gap plus inflation. 
This chapter used an analytical solution that shows the gains from these different 
scenarios compared to the traditional commitment of social welfare. First, the relative gain of the 
different targeting regimes depends on the values of the parameters. Second, the interest-
smoothing regime would be the easiest to implement because of low volatility of output gap but 
the resulting welfare is not higher than the global approach. Third, this interest-smoothing 
regime has the advantage of having a much lower volatility of interest rate which is an advantage 
in case policy makers encounter the lower bound issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Optimal Instrument Rules and Determinacy in Targeting Regimes 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the welfare gain of different targeting approaches were derived 
and calculated using an analytical solution. Those results provided optimal paths but there was 
no mention about specific monetary policies. However, when a central bank selects a target then 
it has to choose among different instrument rules to guide the economy to the corresponding 
optimal paths. In the New Keynesian model, the Taylor rule is traditionally used as the 
instrument but some authors have argued that the determinacy issue may be difficult to solve, 
determinacy being the existence of a stable solution of a single rational expectation dynamic 
system.  However, it is widely recognized how difficult it is to get uniqueness and stability in 
interest rate rules and it has been at the origin of a large literature. As a consequence some 
authors have proposed alternative rules.  
First, following the methodology from Thurston (2012), this chapter finds the optimal 
Taylor rules for not only the discretion and global policies but also for the price level and 
nominal income targeting policies. It can be seen that policy makers can always find a 
determinate solution by choosing certain parameters in the Taylor rule. 
Second, some authors have proposed to use a money rule instead of an interest rate rule. 
It is recognized that money demand and the stock of money play a minor role in current 
monetary theories and is not taken in consideration in the decision making processes at most of 
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central banks.  As Woodford (2008) emphasized, however, it is true that money supply is not 
totally absent in the New Keynesian model, and can be integrated through a money demand 
curve. One of the results of this paper is that it can be proved that conditions for determinacy are 
automatically satisfied when utilizing a particular exogenous money rule. However, those types 
of rules cannot allow policy maker to implement an optimal rule. As a consequence, it is 
necessary to adopt a kind of ‘Taylor money rule’ that controls for inflation and output gap and in 
this case determinacy constraints are not very different from the one encountered with an interest 
rate rule.  
Third, as observed in the previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that inertia and then 
price level stability would enhance welfare11. Even if inflation can be controlled under some 
conditions in the New Keynesian model, there is less obvious reasons to believe that the price 
level is somewhat controlled using a Taylor rule. In his seminal book, Woodford (2003) 
proposed the idea of using a Wicksellian rule. This rule links the nominal interest rate with the 
price level rather than the rate of inflation. In this chapter, it is shown that even if a monetary 
rule would allow central banks to anchor price level, policy makers may also adopt an interest 
rate rule to obtain the same result and it does not materially affect the determinacy issue. A 
central bank would still have to face the same kind of problem and select the parameters in a way 
that will ensure to be in the determinate region. 
3.1 Model 
As in the previous chapter, the model used is the basic New Keynesian model. The model 
that is followed is the one presented by Walsh (2003). Households provide labor, purchase goods 
                                                            
11 See Woodford (2003). For detailed analytical solutions see Marest and Thurston (2013) and Marest (2015) 
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for consumption, hold money and have bonds. Firms produce different goods in a 
monopolistically competitive goods market, designed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Capital stock 
is ignored. We have the traditional log linearized equations: 
t
ttt
ttt g
EixEx   
 1
1
ˆ
  (1) with ttt gg   1  
ttttt uxE    1   (2) with  ttt uu   1   
 
ttttt iyb
pm   )ˆˆ(1ˆˆ   (3) with fttt yyx ˆˆ   and tft zy ˆ
1ˆ 


  
 
      with ttt   1  
 
Equation (1) is the “IS curve”. Equation (2) corresponds to the supply curve; it is the 
Phillips curve, or inflation curve. Equation (3) determines the quantity of money. It is the 
demand for money. The following variables, εt, ηt, and ψt are white noises. 
In the literature, authors look for interest rate rules that would provide the welfare closest 
to the optimal one. McCallum and Nelson (2004) argue for example that policymakers have 
difficulties to come up with a true model in terms of theory but also due to imperfect knowledge 
of the value of the parameters. It becomes then difficult operationally to implement those 
models. Not only is it difficult for the central bank to find with accuracy the current value of 
output but also the natural-rate level of that output, the one that the economy would generate if 
wages and prices were flexible. However, this chapter argues that we can get the path of interest 
rate that corresponds to the optimal solution and find a corresponding interest rule that matches 
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this path. It is a consensus into the literature that the central bank minimizes the following 
welfare:  

 
0
22 ))((
i
itit
i
t xE   
3.2 Determinacy and Optimal Rules   
For each of the instrument rules proposed in the chapter, the analysis contains three steps. 
The first one is to find the determinacy conditions of the model when adopting an instrument 
rule: it involves to obtaining the eigenvalues of the auto-regressive matrix of the systems of 
equations of the model and to see at what conditions they are inside or outside the unit circle. In 
the second step, policy makers have to choose the parameters of the instrument rule to reproduce 
the optimal paths established in the previous chapters. Finally, by combining the two later 
results, the objective is to determine the range of values of the parameters of the optimal 
instrument rule that makes the solution unique and stable. 
3.3 Taylor rules or inflating targeting rules  
First, the question of determinacy is raised when applying an interest rule. The New 
Keynesian Taylor rule method is widely used in monetary economics for the determination of 
inflation. However, with a Taylor rule, some conditions between parameters of the rule are 
necessary to obtain a unique and stable solution.  
3.3.1 Interest rate Taylor rule 
The Taylor rule controls for inflation and output gap: ttxtt vxi   . As a well-
known result, in order to get unique and stable equilibrium in this model with a Taylor Rule, the 
φ’s must satisfy the following condition: 0< κ(φπ-1) + φx(1-β). To find the optimal instrument 
rule for the discretionary policy, the solution for φπ and φx from the Taylor principal can be 
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found with the method of unknown coefficient12. There is a simpler way to arrive at a solution. 
First, following “The Science of Monetary policy” from Clarida and al. (1999), we have from 
equation (7) representing the optimal path of inflation: tt u
)1(
2 


  
So, we have also 
121 )1(  
 tt u  
Then 
)(
)1( 121 

 ttt u   
So 
tttt uE  
 )1(21  
And the same way, we have: 
ttt xxE 1  
As a consequence, the IS curve t
ttt
ttt g
EixEx   
 1
1
ˆ
 can be transformed the following 
way. 
First we replace: it with tgtxtt gxi    
   Etxt+1 with ttt xxE 1  
   Etπt+1 with tttE  1  
                                                            
12 See Lecture notes for Thom Thurston’s Macroeconomics I (Econ 711, CUNY Graduate Center) contain probably the only analytical solution 
for optimal parameters of the Taylor Rule in the context of the basic New Keynesian model. 
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So we get: t
ttgtxt
tt g
gx
xx  
   
Or, after transformations and using  g to cancel gt, we get: 
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

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But, if we incorporate the fact that ttx  then: 


 


x1
 and it is what professor Thurston found through the method of 
unknown coefficients. 
It can be transformed, and we get x 
 1  so the slope of the curve 
representing this relationship is 
 . It is the optimal relationship between φπ and φx. 
Chart 23 shows the stability and uniqueness condition and the optimal Taylor rule with the 
discretion policy. It is the graph found in Thurston (2012). 
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Chart 23: Determinacy zone and optimal relationship between the φπ and φx in the Taylor rule for 
discretion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The region of indeterminacy is the shadow part. We can notice that we have always stable and 
unique solution with φπ>0 and φx>0 if we are on the optimal line and if: 
11 
   
  1)1(  
   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the central bank may adopt other targets that 
require a certain level of commitment. Those approaches are “global” target, “speed limit”, 
“price level” targeting, and “nominal income” targeting. “Global” is inflation targeting using the 
social welfare but assuming commitment, so the price level goes back to its original level. In 
“speed limit”, the central bank reacts to the change of output gap rather than its level. When 
φπ 
φx
Stability and uniqueness condition 
1 
Optimal Relationship
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following “price level” targeting, the welfare that the central bank tries to optimize has the 
volatility of the price level instead of the volatility of inflation. Finally, for the “nominal income” 
targeting, the volatility of output gap in welfare is replaced by the volatility of nominal income13. 
It is possible to find the optimal Taylor rules for each of these policies using the same 
methodology that was used for discretion. Some of them require to compensating for the supply 
shock ut. The list of optimal rules is shown below. 
Those rules are Taylor rules and the relationship between φπ and φx that allows the central bank 
to replicate optimal paths for each targeting approach are found in the same way as described 
above for discretion. It is important to notice that it is necessary to compensate for the cost-push 
shock ut in order to find a solution. Indeed, when linking forward variables with current ones, 
this cost-push shock is present and is not eliminated automatically thus the interest rate has to 
compensate for it. 
Discretion:      ttxtt gxi    with         )1(   x  
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13 See the previous chapter: Marest (2015) 
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Nominal GDP growth:  ttutxtt guxi    
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Chart 24 shows the optimal rules for the different policies, presented the same way has in 
chart 23. The calibration used is Г=0.0048, ρ=0.35, b=1, σ=0.16, κ=0.024 and β=0.99. It is 
conformed to what Woodford (2003) uses as calibration. In the first chapter, table 3 shows the 
calibration used by different authors14. With different values for the calibration, the slopes and 
intersections with the axis change slightly but the concept and the shape stay the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 See Marest and Thurston 2015. “The Value of Central Bank Commitment to the Price Level in the Baseline New 
Keynesian Model” 
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Chart 24: Determinacy condition and optimal relationship between the φπ and φx in the Taylor 
rule for discretion (yellow), global (also speed limit in red), price level targeting (blue) and 
nominal income targeting (violet) 
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Chart 25: Optimal relationship between the φu and φx in the Taylor rule for global (also speed 
limit in red), price level targeting (blue) and nominal income targeting (violet)    
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Charts 24 and 25 show how it is always possible to find a combination of φπ and φx (but 
also φu) of a Taylor rule to replicate optimal paths in a way that gives a unique and stable 
solution. The two parameters of the Taylor rule, φπ and φx, have to be conform to the equations 
developed above and large enough and positive to be in the determinacy zone for the pure 
discretion case. However, for the other regimes, φx has to be negative enough and φπpositive 
enough to be in the determinacy zone.  
3.3.2 Taylor type money rules 
Some authors suggested to using a monetary rule instead of an interest rate rule in order 
to deal with the determinacy issue mentioned above. This paper is looking at not only exogenous 
monetary rules but also rules similar to the Taylor rule with money as an instrument. 
 Exogenous money: ttmt vmm  1  
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We use the following equations: 
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Then putting (6) into (4) eliminating it, we get: 
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bypbxpEmbxE   
121 11  (7) 
Considering that πt = pt – pt-1, equation (5) can be transformed as: 
pt – pt-1 = β(Etpt+1-pt) +κxt+ut (8) 
Then, we consider mt as exogenous, so 
 ttmt vmm  1   (9)  
and we get, following the same kind of reasoning as Walsh when he considered it as exogenous 
(p245-246), using (7), (8), and (9): 
Then the system of equations should be 
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The eigenvalues are complicated formulas. Following Blanchart and Kahn, we look to 
see if we have two eigenvalues outside the unit circle and two forward undetermined variables. 
We would then get a unique and stable solution.  Here the eigenvalues may be complex, meaning 
that the variables may vary in an oscillating way. In these cases, we need to consider the absolute 
values of the eigenvalues to evaluate the uniqueness and stability. The first eigenvalue is ρm 
which we assume to be positive and below 1. So among the three other eigenvalues, we need to 
have one below 1 and two above one when considering absolute values. According to 
simulations, the system is always determinate. 
Money rule that reacts to the shock ut tt um   
From previous paragraphs, we have: 
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The Phillips Curve provides as in previous paragraphs: ttttttt uxppEpp    )( 11  
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So we get by re-arranging: 
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So considering the Phillips curve and the πt=pt-pt-1, we get the following system of equations: 
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The eigenvalues are also very complicated. However, the three eigenvalues are the three 
eigenvalues other than ρm for the case in which ttmt vmm  1  so we have the same 
conditions.  
The exogenous money rule and the money rule that reacts to the cost push shock are always 
determinate but policy makers cannot replicate the optimal policy with those. As a consequence, 
the instrument that the central has to use is a version of the Taylor rule but using money as the 
policy tool.  
Taylor money rule ttg
f
tytptxtt gypxm     11   
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Stability and uniqueness: 
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We have also the Philips Curve: 
ttttt uxE    1  
Let’s consider the special case where φp-1=1. It means that we consider the money rule 
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Both of the eigenvalues will be outside the unit circle if λ2>1 
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Contrary to the condition under the interest rate rule, this condition creates more limits in the 
sense that the φ’s must be below the stability and uniqueness line. The other element that plays a 
role in the shape of determinacy zone is b. The expression 
b
1 is the interest elasticity of money 
demand. When b is increasing, the stability and uniqueness line that delimits the determinacy 
zone is moving down as shown is chart 26. 
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Chart 26: Limit for the determinacy zone in case of the sort of money Taylor rule 
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We can see that the intercepts with the axis in the above chart are positive if 
)1(1 
 b  or using the standard calibration, b<0.966. In this case, for any choice of φπ 
and φx negative the system is stable and unique. However, if )1(1 
 b then we may have 
some constraints, but it depends again on b. We can see that the system will be always 
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determinate for any choice in the optimal line as long as φπ and φx are negative and 
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




)1(
))3()(1(
b or using the standard calibration, b>1.0358. 
The optimal rule for the discretion case can be found using the same methodology that in 
the previous section. To incorporate money in the IS curve, we use equation (6) which 
corresponds to money demand: ttttt iyb
pm   )(1    
Isolating it and replacing in the IS curve, we get 
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   Etxt+1 with ttt xxE 1  
   Etπt+1 with tttE  1  
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Using φp-1=1 to cancel out pt-1 
 
by
  to cancel out ytf 
 
bg
  to cancel out gt 
 φω=1 to cancel out ωt 
We get then: 
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xbb
 
 )2(1  
We can notice in chart 27 that the slope of that line is the same as the one for the 
relationship for the interest rate rule. However, the intercept is different. Again, the influence of 
b is significant. If b is decreasing, the optimal line will move downward. 
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Chart 27: The optimal relationship between φπ and φx for discretion when using the sort of 
money Taylor rule 
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We can see that the intercept of the optimal line with the φπ axis is above zero if 

 )2( b or if we use the standard calibration, b>0.725. The combination of the 
conditions for determinacy and the optimal rule for the discretion policy is shown in chart 28. 
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Chart 28: Condition for determinacy and optimal relationship between φπ and φx for discretion 
when using the sort of money Taylor rule 
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The same way, we can find the optimal rules for the global policy, price level targeting 
and nominal income targeting. 
For global we have: 
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For price level we have: 
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For nominal income growth targeting we have:
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We can see in Chart 29, using the same calibration used in the previous section, that the 
conditions for determinacy are relatively similar to the ones when using the traditional Taylor 
rule. The different optimal lines have different slopes than with the interest rate Taylor rule. In 
addition, the determinacy region is different. This time the system will be always determinate for 
the discretion case if φπ and φx are negative enough. For the other cases, it will be so if φπ is 
negative enough and φx positive enough. Using money as an instrument does not provide any 
advantage in that regard.  
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Chart 29: Determinacy condition and optimal relationship between the φπ and φx in the sort of 
money Taylor rule for discretion (yellow), global (also speed limit in red), price level targeting 
(blue) and nominal income targeting (violet) 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 30: Optimal relationship between the φu and φx in the sort of money Taylor rule for global 
(also speed limit in red), price level targeting (blue) and nominal income targeting (violet) 
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3.4 Wicksellian rules or price level targeting rules 
It has been demonstrated that inertia and then price level stability would enhance 
welfare15. Actually, Woodford (2003) based his theory on the idea that instability in price level is 
the source of disturbance and distortions that prevent sectors of an economy to coordinate in an 
efficient manner. The idea was already promoted by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell 
(1898). He was one of the first economists to articulate comprehensively a theory of fiat money. 
That kind of price level regime was actually implemented in Sweden in the 1930’s. Wicksell was 
recommending in his theory to adopt a rule that would link the nominal interest rate to the price 
level: if prices rise then the interest rate should be raised and if prices decrease then the interest 
rate should be lowered (Wicksell 1898). 
3.4.1 Wicksellian interest rate rule 
In appendix C, a list of different Wicksellian rules is shown with details on determinacy. 
Some of them however don’t allow to finding optimal rules. The interest rate rule that central 
bank should focus on to get optimal instruments has the form  tgtxtptpt gxppi    11 ˆˆ     
with 1ˆ  ppp tt . 
The original price level when the policy starts is p-1. In term of stability and uniqueness we have 
the following equations: 
t
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 1
1   (10) with ttt gg   1  
πt = βEtπt+1+κxt+ut   (11) with  ttt uu   1   
                                                            
15 See Woodford (2003). For detailed analytical solutions see Marest and Thurston (2013) and Marest (2015) 
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and using ttttt ppEE   11 and 1ˆˆ  ttt pp replacing it with the interest rate rule discussed, 
we get: 
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To find the determinacy conditions, it may be useful to establish a value for φp-1. When 
looking for the optimal global rule, the methodology of the previous section is used. We would 
obtain an optimal path if we have: 
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So we need the system of equations, with φg=σ: 
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Then we obtain:  )1(1 p  
And a relationship between φp and φx: )1)(1()1( 
 xp  
If we put the φp-1 that is just above in the interest rate rule we can find more easily the 
conditions for uniqueness and stability by simulation. Chart 31 shows the constraints for 
determinacy and the optimal instrument rules for the different policies considered: discretion, 
global, price level targeting and nominal income targeting.  
For discretion:   )1(  xp  and pp  1  
For price level targeting, because the first order condition links directly the price level and the 
output gap, the Wicksellian interest rate rule becomes tgtxtptpt gxppi    11  and we 
get: 
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For nominal income growth targeting: 
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Chart 31: Determinacy condition and optimal relationship between the φπ and φx in the 
Wicksellian rule for discretion (yellow), global (also speed limit in red), price level targeting 
(blue) and nominal income targeting (violet) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When φx<0, and more exactly when φx<around 2.18 using standard calibration, then the 
determinacy conditions change. As a consequence, a Wicksellian rule would not solve the 
determinacy issue. It is possible also in this case to find an optimal rule for each of the policies 
used in previous chapters, but it requires to selecting some range of the value of the parameters 
of the rules to be determinate. In appendix D, it is shown how the determinacy region may shift 
1 
1
φp 
φx
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and the optimal combination of parameters of the rules may change when the value of a factor is 
changing. 
3.4.2 Wicksellian Money rule 
Another idea to deal with the determinacy issue would be to adopt a Wicksellian money 
rule: the instrument is money but it controls the price level and the output gap. 
Money rule 1111 ˆˆ   pgyxppm ttgftytxtptpt    
In terms of stability and uniqueness, we get the following system of equations: 
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Following the same procedure than in the previous section, it is useful to find a value for φp-1. 
For the global case, if we put this money rule in the IS curve with money, then we get 
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So we obtain from these two equations: 
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In the case )1(1 

bp
we examine what are the condition for stability and 
uniqueness. Due to the complexity of the eigenvalues, we have to use the standard numerical 
values adopted already previously. The results are in chart 32. The determinacy area is found 
through simulation. 
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 Discretion:  bbxp
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For price level targeting, the Wicksellian money rule takes the form 
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For the nominal income growth targeting, we get 
 
bbbbxp
1)1(1
)1(
)1()2(
)1(
)1( 

 

  
 And  )
)1(
1(1  

bp
 
with 

a
a
2
411 2 and 
)1)(1(
)1(
2 


a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Chart 32: Determinacy condition and optimal relationship between the φπ and φx in the sort of 
money Wicksellian rule for discretion (yellow), global (also speed limit in red), price level 
targeting (blue) and nominal income targeting (violet) 
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3.5 Concluding remark 
The concept of determinacy, which is a unique and stable solution, has become a major 
issue in monetary policy analysis. The action of a central bank may be decomposed in two parts. 
First, as shown in the previous chapter, the central bank may try to optimize a different welfare 
than the social welfare and it could obtain a better result, assuming that the government can 
delegate effectively. Second, the central bank can choose among different policies. In the New 
φp 
φx 
1 
1
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Keynesian model, the instrument used by central banks is an interest rate rule, and principally the 
Taylor rule that controls for inflation and output gap. To deal with the determinacy issue 
associated with this Taylor rule, many authors have proposed different rules. One would be to 
adopt a money rule instead of an interest rate rule. Another would be to choose a Wicksellian 
rule that would control for price level and output gap. This paper showed that in any case, when 
looking for the optimal rule, the constraints we can observe related to determinacy with the 
Taylor rule are still present in a similar fashion when implementing a money rule or a 
Wicksellian rule. 
As a result, this chapter demonstrated that a central bank can use indifferently a 
traditional interest rate Taylor rule, a “money Taylor rule”, an interest rate Wicksellian rule or a 
“money Wicksellian rule” and still guide with certainty the economy to the optimal paths for the 
different regimes. Policy makers can do this provided they are free to select the φ’s of the 
respective rules according to the equations established above and in conformity with the 
conditions for determinacy.  There are infinite sets of combinations of that sort that have 
identical consequences. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: 
Appendix A shows the basic calculation of welfare for discretion, pre-commitment and global. 
Those results were used and formulas were transformed to calculate welfare for the alternative 
regimes. 
Welfare for Discretion 
If inflation and output gap follow the paths developed above in the discretion case, then the 
resulting loss function is: 
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In the “Science for Monetary Policy” (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999), the objective function 
has the form: 


 
0
22 ))((
2
1max
i
itit
i
t xE   
Welfare is then: 
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Welfare for pre-commitment: 
So we can see that the calculation for the welfare will be similar to the calculation of the 
welfare for the discretion case, except a few changes. 
The factor  
Becomes  
Also we have to multiply the result for inflation by (1-βρ). Thus, the formula for the 
welfare of the pre-commitment case according to the paths extracted from the “Science of 
Monetary Policy” paper is: 
 
And we can obviously see that this welfare is above the welfare from discretion. 
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entsmpprecommitmdiscretion WW   
Welfare for global approach: 
The welfare due to inflation is: 
 
  
  
The welfare due to output gap is: 
  
So the total welfare is  
 
We can observe with all different values for the parameters that the welfare with the 
global approach is above the welfare with the pre-commitment from the “Science of Monetary 
Policy” Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and then above the welfare with discretion. So at the 
end we obtain: 
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Appendix B: 
Appendix B shows that the results are robust regardless the value of other parameters. It is robust 
in the sense that the superiority of certain regimes against others is not changed when the value 
of those parameters change, but of course the difference in welfare will be more or less 
important. The other parameters such as ρ, β, or θ don’t play a major role in how to select the 
different targeting regimes. 
Chart 33: Influence of ρ and β on welfare for discretion, pre-commitment and global 
a/ Influence of ρ on welfare   b/ Influence of β on welfare 
 
 
 
Chart 33 a/ shows that the highest the persistence, the lowest welfare is. Again, similar to 
the reason behind the influence of price stickiness, inflation and output gap adjust much more 
slowly with a higher persistence. As a consequence, welfare is lower because the difference 
90 
 
between the evolution of the economy and inflation and the path when prices are flexible is 
larger for a longer period of time. Furthermore, the difference between global and discretion is 
accentuated when persistence is higher. The selection of regime makes more difference when 
persistence is higher. Chart 33 b/ indicates also that the higher β, the lower welfare. Indeed, 
welfare is negative of the discounted value of the future volatilities of inflation and output gap. 
As a consequence, the higher the discount factor, the lower the welfare. It corresponds to the 
situation in which the society in general is discounting less the future losses, putting more value 
on the losses. 
Using the relationship between κ and Г according to Woodford, there we can observe the 
influence of θ on welfare on chart 34. It seems that it does not have any strong influence. 
However, κ has also θ in its term, so it may be better if we use a figure that shows how welfare 
changes when θ and ω change. 
Chart 34: Influence of θ on welfare for discretion, pre-commitment and global 
a/ Welfare for discretion, pre-commitment b/ percentage difference between welfare for global  
and global    and welfare for discretion 
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Volatility of Inflation 
We can calculate the volatility of inflation with the same methodology than Appendix A. 
The gain in welfare from commitment has been attributed to a better trade-off between the 
volatility of inflation and volatility of output gap. The volatility of inflation is decreasing and the 
volatility of output gap is increasing but in a more favorable way for the calculation of welfare. 
Appendix A shows the calculation of the volatilities and the trade-offs described above for the 
calculation of welfare. 
For discretion, we get: 
 with 
 
For the pre-commitment case, we just have to transform Dd as: 
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Volatility of output gap 
In contrast, volatility of output gap should decrease when adopting a commitment 
approach. Svensson (1997) argued that welfare could improve with commitment having both 
volatility of inflation and volatility of output gap increase. It is what he called a “free lunch”. 
However, he obtained this result with a backward looking Phillips curve. 
In the discretion case, we have also   
So  
So we can use the results we had for inflation. We just have to change Dd by: 
 
with 
 
For the pre-commitment case, we have a similar situation in the sense that we get the volatility of 
xt using the volatility of πt but we just have to transform Dpre by:  
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we get  with 
 
For the global case, 
 
With   
 
With  
 
We get 
 
    
The chart 35 provides a perspective of the difference between the discretion, pre-
commitment and global regimes. Chart 35 confirms that the volatility of inflation is decreasing 
when adopting commitment. It is particularly true for lower κ and Г. It is noticeable however, 
that when prices are more flexible volatility of inflation is higher for global than for pre-
commitment. 
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Chart 35: Volatilities of inflation and output gap for discretion, pre-commitment and global 
a/ Volatility of inflation    b/ Volatility of output gap  
 
We can obtain the same way the volatilities for other policies, and they are shown in the graph 
36. Charts 37 to 42 show the comparison between the different regimes. 
Chart 36: Volatility of inflation and output gap for discretion, global, price level targeting, 
nominal income growth and interest rate smoothing 
a/ Volatility of Inflation    b/ Volatility of Output Gap 
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Chart 37: Comparison between price level targeting and global target 
a/ Volatility Inflation   b/ Difference  c/ Percentage Difference 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap   e/ Difference  f/ Percent Difference 
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Chart 38: Comparison between price level targeting and interest rate smoothing approach 
a/ Volatility Inflation   b/ Difference  c/ Percent Difference 
 
 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap   e/ Difference  f/ Percent Difference 
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Chart 39: Comparison between price level targeting and nominal income targeting 
a/ Volatility Inflation   b/ Difference   c/ Percent Difference 
 
 
 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap    e/ Difference  f/ Percent Difference 
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Chart 40: Comparison between interest rate smoothing approach and global 
a/ Volatility inflation   b/ Difference   c/ Percent Difference 
 
 
 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap   e/ Difference  f/ Percent Difference 
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Chart 41: Comparison between interest rate smoothing approach and nominal income growth 
targeting 
a/ Volatility Inflation   b/ Difference   c/ Percent Difference 
 
 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap   e/ Difference   f/ Percent Difference   
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Chart 42: Comparison between nominal income growth targeting and global 
 
a/ Volatility inflation   b/ Difference   c/ Percent Difference 
 
 
 
 
d/ Volatility Output Gap    e/ Difference   f/ Percent Difference 
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Volatility of interest rate with shock gt: 
If we want to incorporate the IS shock, then we just add σgt to it for the discretion, pre-
commitment, and global cases. 
For the discretion case, we then get: 
with and  
 so the total variance is: 
with  
For the pre-commitment case, we proceed the same way and we get: 
 
For the global case, we have: 
 
So at each step, the gt-1 due to it-1 disappears because of δgt-1 at the end of the expression and we 
are left with σgt as with the other cases, so the variance is: 
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Volatility of real interest rate without gt: 
In the discretion case,  
with: 
 
we get  with 
 
For the pre-commitment case, we just have to transform Dr as: 
 
So we would get:  
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For the global case,  
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 with  
 
We get
 
 
     
If we want to incorporate the IS shock, then we just add σgt to it for the discretion, pre-
commitment, and global cases. As for the volatility of interest rate, we just have to add 
to the volatilities calculated above. 
Chart 43 shows how the interest rate volatility for the global case is lower than the one 
for discretion. The difference is significant and it can be used as an argument to implement the 
global regime when a central bank has to face the issue of lower bound. 
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Chart 43: Volatility of interest rate with shock gt for discretion, pre-commitment and global 
a/ Volatility of interest rate b/ Percentage difference between  c/ Volatility of interest rate 
    volatility of interest rate for global depending on κ only 
    and the one for discretion 
 
   
 
Appendix C 
 
In appendix C, calculations are shown with different interest rate rules. However, those 
rules are not useful in the sense that they don’t allow central banks to replicate optimal paths. 
Interest rate rule tgtpt gpi  
^
: we could start with that interest rate, and it is the one Gali 
(2008) used with in addition the terms with gt to get rid of demand shock. 
tt px
^

 where 1
^
 ppp tt  
p-1 is the price level before t=0. 
Gali (2008) explains how he obtains the optimal path for tp
^
and xt: 
ttt upp )1(1
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
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With 

a
a
2
411 2 and 2)1(  
a  
Then the optimal path for xt is: 
ttt uxx )1(1 
    
with 00 )1(
ux 

  
Using his approach, we can also find the path for inflation:  
And we can get also the optimal path for interest rate: 
 
We can then look at different interest rules. 
Replacing it in the IS curve t
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ttt g
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 1
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ˆ
and using ttt uxx )1(1 
    and 
 
We obtain: 
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And having tt px
^

 , we get then: 
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With φg=σ, we still cannot see a relationship in the form of ttt upp )1(1
^^

  
because we don’t have 1
^
tp  in the expression. We cannot get then an optimal path using this 
interest rate rule; 1
^
tp needs to be added. 
In term of stability and uniqueness for the interest rate rule tgtpt gpi  
^
we have the 
following equations: 
t
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1
ˆ
  (1) with ttt gg   1  
πt = βEtπt+1+κxt+ut   (2) with  ttt uu   1   
and replacing it with the interest rate rule discussed, we get: 
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The eigenvalues of the matrix are complicated and difficult to transform, so it is better to 
use calibration, using σ=1, κ=0.3 and β=0.99, which seem to be the standard calibration. 
Gali finds that it is always stable and unique. 
Interest rate rule ttxtpt vxpi    
This time, we associate the New Keynesian model with an interest rule that depends on pt, not πt. 
ttxtpt vxpi    
We look for the solutions for φπ and φx. As a consequence, the IS curve 
t
ttt
ttt g
Ei
xEx   
 1
1  
can be transformed the following way. 
First we replace it with tgtxtpt gxpi    
   Etxt+1 with ttt xxE 1  
   Etπt+1 with tttE  1  
So we get: 
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Or, after transformations and using  g to cancel gt 
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But, we have to incorporate the fact that ttx  to get a relationship between φx and φp then 
we use pt= πt + pt-1 to get: 
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Then we need to have φp=0 to use the optimal relationship between xt and πt. 
As a consequence we get: 
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It doesn’t seem realistic because φx is then negative using the standard calibration. At this 
point, because of the strange result, we could have tried to do two things. One thing we could 
have done is to try to add also φp-1pt-1 in the interest rate rule. However, to get an optimal 
relationship between xt and πt, we would have needed the relationship φp-1=-φp, so we would 
have gotten again the Taylor rule. 
Another thing we could have done is to try to get a relationship between xt and pt so we 
could have obtained the optimal relationship between φp and φx. We could for example find the 
first order condition of the Lagrange with the loss function 

 
0
22 ))((
2
1max
i
itit
i
t xE   and 
the Phillips curve relative to pt for the discretion case, but it does not make sense because we 
have to find the first order conditions with πt and xt. Anyway, we would have found the 
following relationship: 
 
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1
1tt
t
ppx  
tt x
 )1(   which is different from what we got previously. 
So it seems that it is not really possible to follow an interest rule with pt and xt when the loss 
function depends on πt and xt. 
For the stability and uniqueness conditions, we have: 
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So the IS curve becomes 
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And the eigenvalues are complicated formulas and not easy to transform. As a 
consequence, we can use calibration to try to figure out if the system is stable and unique. We 
use σ=1, κ=0.3, and β=0.99. Following Blanchart and Kahn, we look to see if we have two 
eigenvalues outside the unit circle and two forward undetermined variables. We would then get a 
unique and stable solution. Here the eigenvalues may be complex, meaning that the variables 
may vary in an oscillating way. In these cases, we need to consider the absolute values of the 
eigenvalues to evaluate the uniqueness and stability. Using a wide range of values for φp and φx 
we have some restrictions. 
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Interest rate rule ttptxtpt vpxpi   11  
Because we cannot get the optimal path using the previous interest rate rule, an idea 
would be to include φp-1pt-1 into the rule. Using the same system of equations as above but with 
φp-1pt-1 into the rule, then we would need to have φp-1=-φp, so we would have gotten again the 
traditional Taylor rule ttxtt vxi   . In term of determinacy, we would have the following 
system of equations: 
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It is similar to the system previously found but with φp-1. 
 
Interest rate rule tgtptpt gppi    1
^
1
^
 
As described above, it is necessary to include φp-1 into the interest rate rule in order to 
obtain an optimal path. In this case, we then obtain the following relationship when looking for 
the optimal path: 
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And this time we can relate to the equation ttt upp )1(1
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
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And the system of equations we get is: 
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In term of stability and uniqueness for the interest rate rule tgtptpt gppi    1
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we have 
the following equations: 
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See below when φx=0: according to the determinacy conditions below when we consider 
xt, then it is enough to be determinate if φp>φp-1. Using the calibration ρ=0.5, β=0.99, Г=2, 
κ=0.3, σ=1, we can notice that for the optimal case the system is not determinate.  It would be 
determinate only if Г<0.3 
Appendix D 
In this appendix, through an example, it is shown how the determinacy condition and the line 
representing the optimal relationship between the parameters of a rule may change when a 
parameter changes. In the following example, the central bank adopt a Wicksellian rule for a 
global targeting, and the weight on output gap in the welfare function changes from Г=2 to Γ=1. 
In chart 44, we can see that the slope of the optimal combination of φp and φx is changing. In 
addition, the entire determinacy region is shifting to the lower part of the graph. The calibration 
is the one above in the paper. 
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Chart 44: Shift of determinacy zone and change of slope of optimal combination of φp and φx 
when adopting a Wicksellian rule and a global target 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We get φp=-φp-1 when φx=0 at Г=0.3. Then φp=φp-1=φx=0. 
As illustrated in chart 45, for Г<0.3 then we have determinacy for φx=0 because φp>φp-1 
 
 
 
ϕp 
ϕx 
(1‐κσ/Γ)ρ+(1‐δ)(σκ/Γ‐1)
‐((1‐κσ/Γ)ρ+(1‐δ)(1+σκ/Γ))Γ/κ 
Slope κ/Γ 
Effect of lowering Γ 
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Chart 45: Determinacy zone and optimal combination of φp and φx when adopting a Wicksellian 
rule and a global target with Γ<0.3, here Γ=0.2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We get φp=-φp-1 when φx=0 at Г=0.3. Then φp=φp-1=φx=0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ϕp 
ϕx 
Slope κ/Γ
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be below zero when Γ is 
very low
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